The spring 2007 edition of Parameters the U.S. Army War College Quarterly, out of Carlisle, PA, included a brief review of my book Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations in its regular column Editor's Shelf:

An insightful book, Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations by Aaron Mannes (Foreword by R. James Woolsey) provides the discerning reader with an opportunity for reflection and comparison. This work was originally published in 2004 by Rowman & Littlefield and profiles 20 Middle East terror organizations along with the groups and rogue nations who support them. The author analyzes the intentions, histories, and methodologies of these organizations to provide a solid foundation with which to contrast today’s extremist and insurgent. This is an excellent reference for any professional in the strategic defense arena.

In the Arab world, according to the eminent Bernard Lewis, the nation-state is faced with pressures from above and below. From below tribal, sectarian, and ethnic loyalties frequently trump national allegiances. From above, grand causes, pan-Arabism for much of the 20th century, now Islamism trump nationalism.

The pair of bombings in Iraq yesterday, targeting the Iraqi Parliament and the Sarrafiya Bridge had many implications – but they were both attacks on the concept of Iraq as a nation. According to radical Islamist doctrine (as described in The Management of Savagery by Abu Bakr Naji, translated by William McCants at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center) when a region dissolves into savagery people seeking security will rally around tribal affinities, gangs, and prominent individuals. These local actors can then be co-opted to the Islamist cause. By this means, the loyalty to the broader Islamist community will trump local and national affiliations.

The attack on the Parliament has received the greater attention in the international media. The terrorist’s capability of striking at the very heart of the Iraqi government and U.S. administration in the supposedly secure Green Zone will obviously undermine perception of security. It also has an international impact and can only diminish the already low level of Am

erican confidence that progress is being made. The Parliament is only a nascent Iraqi institution, and held in low repute by most Iraqis both for its fecklessness and for its relative privilege. The bombing may improve the Parliament’s standing by showing the Iraqi people that their elected leaders share their risks, and ideally it would spur the Parliament to more effective action. This is a slender hope.

(Apparently the bomber was an MP’s bodyguard. A politician’s bodyguard also took the Saddam execution video. Better regulation of these posses may have both security implications and improve the Parliament’s standing among the Iraqi public.)

The Sarrafiya Bridge was another matter. A relic from a previous round of nation-building (by the British in the middle of the 20th century) the bridge, also known as Jisr al-Hadeed (“the iron bridge”) was a central artery linking the banks of the Tigris. According to Omar Fadhil at Iraq the Model most of his friends were far more upset about the destruction of the bridge than about the attack on Parliament. Many Baghdadis have fond memories of the bridge itself. Practically, its loss virtually slices the city in two.

Sarrafiya’s destruction is yet another blow to any possibility of normal life in Baghdad, further diminishing Baghdad as a cosmopolitan and distinctly Iraqi city, and atomizing Iraqi society.

Cross-posted to the CounterterrorismBlog.

According to U.S. officials, the Iranian forces that seized the British sailors earlier today were Revolutionary Guards, also known as Pasdaran. This is a significant distinction. The Pasdaran is a military force that is independent of Iran’s regular military. The regular military is charged with defending the Iranian state, the Pasdaran defend the Islamic revolution. In this role, domestically they have crushed opposition riots and internationally they are linked to efforts to export the revolution. The Pasdaran collaborate with Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist groups and are central to other covert Iranian international activities (including, allegedly, in Iraq.)

From the Marine Barracks attack in 1983 which forced the U.S. led peacekeeping force out of Beirut, leaving Lebanon to the tender mercies of Syria and Hezbollah, to the hostage crises of the 1980s which sparked major political scandals in both the U.S. and France, to the AMIA attack in 1994 which both retaliated against Israel and punished Argentina for reneging on technology deals with Syria and Iran, and to the 1996 Khobar Bombing which increased pressure on the U.S.-Saudi relationship – the Iran has a strong record of carefully and effectively deploying terror attacks and hostage taking to further its goals. The Pasdaran have frequently been charged with implementing these operations.

In this case, targeting British servicemen could part of a growing strategy to push the U.K. away from the U.S. The strategy parallels the al-Qaeda strategy of targeting U.S. allies in Iraq (exemplified by the 3/11 Madrid attack which effectively knocked Spain out of Iraq.) With Tony Blair almost a lame duck and the Iraq war tremendously unpopular in the U.K., the next Prime Minister will probably distance himself from the U.S. While the U.S. and U.K. are certain to maintain a close alliance on many issues, there won’t be much British enthusiasm of high-risk American endeavors. Knowing that a stern line with Iran may result in messy hostage crises may lead to shifts in British policy.

For the United States, this would be a major loss. British support has been crucial, both in providing manpower on the ground but also in maintaining at least some international legitimacy in Iraq and elsewhere. For Iran, fostering U.S.-U.K. rifts is advantageous in Iraq where the Iranians would have a completely free hand in the Shia dominated south. These rifts could also create tensions in the efforts to maintain a united diplomatic front in checking Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

During the Lebanon hostage crisis of the 1980s Britain, unlike the U.S. and France absolutely refused to negotiate with terrorists. This stiff upper lip may be a thing of the past. A few years ago, after a diplomatic spat with Iran, the British government released Hadi Soleimanpour, Iran’s Ambassador to Argentina when the AMIA bombing occurred, rather than comply with Argentina’s extradition request. (See my 2004 article on this directly below.)

Following is an article I wrote several years ago about Britain's failure to heed an Argentine reguest to extradite Hadi Soleimanpour, who had been Iran's Ambassador to Argentina in 1994.

It remains all too relevant today.

Iran's Terror Goes Unchecked
January 20, 2004

By Aaron Mannes
A UPI Outside View commentary


SILVER SPRING, Md., Jan. 19 (UPI) -- Besides delaying justice to the victims of the 1994 Argentine Israel Mutual Association terror attack in Argentina, Britain's November decision not to extradite Iranian diplomat Hadi Soleimanpour demonstrated to Iran's leaders they could use threats and intimidation to evade responsibility for supporting terrorism.

An untimely lesson, as the British, French, and German governments were pressing to bring Iran's nuclear program into full compliance with international inspections regimes -- after 18 years of deception according to the International Atomic Energy Agency report -- while urging the United States not to take the issue to the U.N. Security Council.

Of the eight Iranians wanted by Argentina for their roles in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA building in Buenos Aires in which 86 were killed and more than 300 were injured, only Soleimanpour, who was studying in Britain, was in a country where a warrant could be served.

Argentina provided 2,600 pages of documentation to support the charges. U.S. and Israeli intelligence assisted the Argentine investigation, and senior Israeli officials called it "professional, razor-sharp, in-depth, and courageous."

But after Soleimanpour's arrest, Britain's Tehran Embassy was fired on and Iran briefly recalled its ambassador to Britain, warning that Anglo-Iranian relations would suffer if Soleimanpour was not released. While the British government claimed the decision not to extradite Soleimanpour was strictly a legal ruling, a politician, the Home Secretary David Blunkett, made the decision.

Arguably, relenting on Soleimanpour's extradition might have bought maneuvering room on the nuclear inspections. The lack of resolve from the staunchest European state augured badly for the European initiative.

Now, more than two months later, Iran continues to "discuss" exactly which of its nuclear activities need to be halted -- while recent inspections show it was closer to constructing a nuclear weapon than previously believed.

Argentina's investigation of the AMIA bombing shows how terrorism is part of Iran's diplomatic toolkit (or diplomats are instruments of Iran's terror network), which makes the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran truly harrowing.

Argentina's report on the AMIA bombing is extensive and contains some damning conclusions.

First, it says that Iran and Hezbollah worked together seamlessly to execute the act. A Lebanese Hezbollah member carried out the attack and Hezbollah operations chief Imad Mughniyah assembled the Buenos Aires terror cell. The decision to attack AMIA was made by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and then President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Ali Fallahian, Iran's Intelligence minister at the time, and officials at Iran's Buenos Aires Embassy directed the operation.

"Cultural Attache" Mohsen Rabbani, the lead planner, may have purchased the Renault van used in the bombing. Soleimanpour, then Iran's ambassador to Argentina, oversaw the operation. The report also indicates the same terror infrastructure carried out the 1992 bombing of Israel's Buenos Aires Embassy.

Both attacks were quickly organized reactions to events in the Middle East. The March 1992 embassy bombing was a response to Israel's February 1992 assassination of top Hezbollah leader Abbas Musawi. The AMIA attack was a response to the Argentine government's breaking an agreement to sell missile and nuclear technology to Iran and in revenge for Israel's May 1994 abduction of senior Hezbollah leader Mustafa Dirani, according to the report.

The Argentina bombings were not exceptional. Bombing U.S. and French facilities in Lebanon drove Western peacekeepers out of Lebanon in the early 1980s. Hostage taking throughout the 1980s, and a series of bombings in Paris in the late 1980s, pressured the U.S. and France to reduce their support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. The 1996 attack on the U.S. installation at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia is another example of Iran sponsoring terror without retribution.

With nuclear arms Iran would be able to launch such attacks with impunity and could even threaten nuclear terror.

The willingness and ability of Iran to orchestrate terror worldwide ought to galvanize efforts to frustrate Iran's nuclear ambitions. Soleimanpour's extradition and trial would have sent a strong message that Iran would be held accountable for its actions. Instead, the opposite message was sent, thereby encouraging Iran in its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons -- the ultimate guarantor that they will not have to answer for their misdeeds.

The terror attack on AMIA -- a symbolic civilian target -- foreshadowed 9/11. But it could also be the harbinger of something unimaginably worse.


-- Aaron Mannes is the author of Profiles in Terror (profilesinterror.com), forthcoming Spring 2004 and is the former director of research at the Middle East Media Research Institute.

Sri Lanka's Daily News reports that the LTTE has stolen Norwegian passports and sold them to al-Qaeda affiliates. This is not implausible. Rohan Gunaratna (currently head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore) wrote in Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, that the LTTE provided forged passports for Ramzi Yousef (specialists close to the WTC 1 trials dispute this assertion). Also, while allied with the Pakistani government in the late 1980s and early 1990s the LTTE smuggled weapons from Pakistan-based Islamists to their counterparts in the Philippines.

Naturally, allies of the Sri Lankan government are playing up this possible link between their local enemy and the enemy which is the focus of international attention. However, if this cooperation occurred it should not be construed as a grand strategic alliance. The LTTE has an international network of support among the Tamil diaspora and, because of Sri Lanka's strategic location astride shipping lanes, its own fleet of sea-going vessels. So it is well positioned to play a role in trans-national criminal activity. The alleged LTTE passport sales highlight how terrorism is the tip of the iceberg of trans-national threats.

In the past I've written that the U.S. should expand its efforts against the LTTE because it was morally consistent with targeting terrorists, it would contribute to stability on the Indian-subcontinent, and because the LTTE was embedded in international criminal networks that also service Islamist terrorists. It would appear, based on recent arrests of LTTE operatives attempting to purchase weapons in the U.S. (see here and here) that the US. has stepped up operations against the LTTE. However, the Tigers have an international network and it is less clear if resources have been devoted to fostering the regional structures necessary to effectively target an organization like the Tamil Tigers.

Cross-posted to the CounterterrorismBlog.

Last Saturday night (with President Bush landing in Colombia the next day) the U.S. Embassy in Bogota confirmed that U.S. and Colombian soldiers had engaged in a joint operation seeking to rescue three U.S. military contractors who have been held by the FARC since February 2003.

The Embassy’s confirmation that an operation was in progress was also, effectively, a confirmation that the operation would not succeed. There have been two major factors preventing successful hostage rescues in Colombia. The thick, triple canopy jungle helps facilitate evasion by guerillas. Also, Colombia’s conscript army includes large numbers of individuals with connections to Colombia’s various armed groups. (Entry into elite units that receive U.S. training is vetted – although some elite commanders have been linked to the AUC.) Because of these connections, the hostage-takers are usually informed by cell phone of major operations and have ample time to relocate hostages.

In addition, the FARC will murder hostages during rescue attempts.

Apparently a combined US-Colombian mission in late January obtained some useful information about the location of the U.S. hostages Marc Gonsalves, Tom Howes, and Keith Stansell. But if information about the operation reached the media it had certainly reached the FARC.

Hostage rescue is always a tough and risky operation. Assuming the hostages can be located, there is the risk that the operation will go badly and the hostages will be killed.

Colombia’s President Uribe however, is in a tight spot. His administration has been rocked by scandal in which many figures close to him have been accused of links to the AUC. He could have used a successful hostage rescue. That the rescued hostages would have been Americans, just as President Bush was landing, would have shored up his support domestically and with his leading foreign backer.

Uribe can’t be blamed for trying – his last hostage rescue attempt reaped unexpected rewards. On December 31 Colombia troops attacked a FARC camp where Fernando Araujo, a former economic development minister, was being held. A FARC captive for six years, Araujo heard the helicopters and made a run for it. After wandering in the jungle for five days he found help. He quickly became a celebrity in Colombia, discussing his experience as a FARC hostage. When Colombia’s Foreign Minister, Maria Consuelo Araujo (no relation), was forced to resign because her brother and father were both linked to the AUC, Uribe quickly appointed Fernando Araujo to replace her.

FARC holds several thousand Colombian hostages for ransom and about 60 prominent hostages, including the U.S. contractors and former Colombian Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, for trading for imprisoned FARC members. Uribe has resisted international calls for hostage negotiations, but the military options are limited.

The recent report that Chiquita Brands International has been fined $25 million for paying $1.7 million to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym AUC) certainly raises the specter of giant American corporations in collaborating with local thugs to oppress the local population in order to provide cheap produce for the American people and maximize profits. The fact that Chiquita Brands is the successor to the notorious United Fruit Company, which for decades was involved in malfeasance in Latin America, only contributes to this image.

The reality may be more complicated. First, although the fine is for paying the AUC, the plea agreement also states that Chiquita made payments to the FARC and ELN. The company claims, plausibly, that these payments were necessary to do business in Colombia and protect is employees. The DOJ filing reports that after the AUC forced FARC out of the area where Chiquita was operating, Carlos Castano, AUC chief and mass murderer, made clear, albeit unspoken, threats. Recent kidnappings of geologists and oil workers as well as FARC attacks on dairies affiliated with Nestle further support the argument that doing business in much of Colombia requires paying off loathsome people.

Chiquita disclosed its payments to the AUC to DOJ in April 2003 and publicly in May 2004. A month later they completed the sale of their Colombian operation to a local company.

This raises an important moral question. Multi-nationals are accused of many evils, but because of their international standing they are also subject to international pressure and the laws of Western democratic nations. They also, at least occasionally, are run by moral people who are at least somewhat concerned with these issues. When these operations are taken over by local companies they are less subject to these pressures. Alternately, if the operations close down completely – or are dissuaded from even entering Colombia - it only forces more people into the illicit economy.

Chiquita’s actions were illegal and their payments helped the AUC continue its vicious campaign. But the underlying issue is the broader security situation in Colombia. As long as the writ of law does not extend fully throughout the country and there are large armed groups challenging state authority, businesses will be forced into deals with the devil.

This week saw two terror attacks that apparently came close to high-level officials: the Taliban suicide bombing at Bagram Air Force Base while Vice President Cheney was staying there, and the Tamil Tiger (LTTE) mortar attack on an aircraft carrying U.S. Ambassador Robert Blake, along with the Italian and German Ambassadors. In Afghanistan, the Taliban insist that they were targeting Cheney, while U.S. officials claim that the Taliban do not have the capability. In contrast, the LTTE insists that it was not targeting the international diplomats, but the Sri Lankan government claims that they were. It is unlikely that either attack expressly targeted the officials. But the difference in the claims about the attack illustrates the differences between the two conflicts and between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 terror.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban apparently claimed that Cheney was the target of the attack on Bagram. However, the Taliban had little notice of Cheney’s movements and suicide bombings take some time to prepare. Besides the logistics the bomber has to be completely prepared psychologically – at the same time, an indoctrinated bomber cannot be kept waiting, otherwise the bomber may have second thoughts. It is conceivable that the Taliban had a suicide bombing in the works and shifted it to Bagram when they learned that Cheney was there. But changing plans quickly increases the likelihood of being intercepted if the new plan takes the bombers to an area that has not been carefully reconnoitered. Also, the bomber made no effort (and really had no chance) of penetrating deeply into Bagram.

That the Taliban readily claimed that they were targeting Cheney shows how presenting the image of strength and the ability to hit the United States is essential to the Taliban and the broader Islamist cause.

In Sri Lanka the Sri Lankan government and two former Tamil Tigers who are now allied with the Sri Lankan government have insisted that the Tigers – who have a well-developed intelligence infrastructure and have carried out innumerable, high-level attacks – must have known about the movements of the international diplomats and intentionally targeted them. The Tigers formally claim that the government should have informed the Tigers about the movements of the diplomats.

The LTTE is a truly vicious terrorist group that has pioneered suicide bombings and fanatically prevented any reasonable settlement of Sri Lanka’s ongoing civil war. But they have also calibrated their violence when necessary. Despite long-standing U.S. support for the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE has specifically avoided targeting Americans (including not targeting U.S. military trainers in Sri Lanka.) Also, the LTTE’s one foray into international terrorism, the 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, was a major strategic blunder turning India, the regional heavyweight, into an enemy. The LTTE’s strategic depth ought to be the Indian province of Tamil Nadu, home to over 50 million ethnic Tamils. While the LTTE has received support from sympathetic Indian Tamils in the past, India’s overall posture has made that more difficult.

This analysis, from a retired Indian army officer at the South Asia Analysis Group explains how the attack was in fact part the LTTE overall operational strategy and ceased the LTTE was contacted by a third party. In short, directly attacking U.S. officials would be a major departure from long-standing LTTE policy.

(For background on the Sri Lanka’s civil war see my Daily Standard article and on LTTE efforts to purchase arms in the U.S. see here and here.)

The Taliban are part of a global movement that is seeking to challenge the international order, whereas the Tigers seek portray themselves as an oppressed minority seeking their due. Interestingly, the targets responses are also opposite. The United States has played down Taliban capabilities. The Sri Lankan government, in turn, is portraying itself as the victim of a super-powerful terrorist organization and is seeking to enlist international aid against its enemy.

The LTTE is the old terrorism, where the violence, while terrible, was part of a political strategy and could be limited when it suited the terrorist’s purposes. The LTTE is also a hierarchical organization in which, ultimately, LTTE founder and leader Prabhakaran make the big decisions. That is, the LTTE’s terror is first limited by their desires – not their capabilities. With an international fundraising and propaganda network the LTTE unquestionably has the operatives, intelligence, and resources to undertake international terror attacks – they have chosen not to do so. In the case of the Taliban and other Islamist groups, the limitations are in the capabilities – not their desires. There is no question that the Taliban would have murdered Cheney had they been able to do so. For that matter, if they were able to, they would almost certainly use WMD against the United States. Thankfully their capacity to launch long distance attacks against far targets appears limited – for now.

The recent attacks by the Tigers and the Taliban – and the aftermath of these attacks, illustrate the opposite poles in terrorist strategies. No counter-terror strategy or accompanying information war strategy should ignore that paradigm.

This morning National Review Online ran my article on North Korea's long history of supporting terrorism and how that will play into negotiations over the new agreement.

February 15, 2007, 6:00 a.m.

The T Word
The lifting of North Korea’s designation as a terrorist-sponsoring nation has a lot to do with Japan.

By Aaron Mannes

One of the conditions of the agreement with North Korea is that the United States starts the process of removing North Korea from the list of terrorist-sponsoring nations. Although North Korea’s nuclear program is the central issue, removal from the U.S. list of sponsors of terrorism has been a North Korean priority since February 2000. Inclusion on this list restricts U.S. exports to North Korea and requires the U.S. to veto World Bank and IMF aid to North Korea. The primary complainant regarding North Korean terrorism is Japan, which would also be a major donor in the event of a long-term aid package to North Korea. (For an excellent backgrounder on this issue see the CRS report North Korea: Terrorism List Removal.) Consequently, the bilateral North Korean-Japanese negotiations will be much more than a sideshow—they may provide an important window into North Korean strategy.

North Korea has a long history of sponsoring terror and other international provocations. In November 1987 North Korea bombed a (South) Korean Airline Boeing 707 in mid-flight, killing 115 people. In 1983 a bomb detonated in Rangoon, Myanmar, minutes before South Korea’s president was to lay a wreath there. The bomb killed 17 senior South Korean officials and wounded 14 others. There have been innumerable bloody incursions into South Korea by North Korean forces, and many attacks and attempted attacks on both South Koreans traveling abroad and North Korean defectors. Lower-level violence is almost constant. Reportedly, graduating from North Korean Special Forces training requires successfully entering South Korea and committing an act of vandalism. (Since the Special Forces are one of the only segments of North Korean society that eats enough, candidates have great incentive to succeed.)

Despite decades of being on the receiving end of North Korean violence, in June 2000 South Korea pushed the U.S. not to consider this past history and to remove North Korea from the list of terror sponsoring nations.

The rationale for North Korea’s inclusion on the list is North Korea’s kidnapping of over a dozen Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. The kidnapped Japanese were used to train North Korean agents (the woman who confessed to bombing the Korean airliner in 1987 claimed that she was trained to pass as Japanese by a kidnapped Japanese woman). In a September 2002 summit between Kim Jong Il and Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi North Korea admitted to kidnapping 13 Japanese citizens and claimed that eight had died and allowed the remaining five to return to Japan. While North Korea claims that the issue is closed, the Japanese are not satisfied. Japan has since claimed that the remains of two of the allegedly kidnapped Japanese that were handed over to the Japanese were not those of the kidnap victims.

North Korea has also reportedly provided a haven to members of the Japanese Red Army (JRA), a far-left terrorist group that was aligned with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and other leftist radical terrorists and carried out many bloody attacks. In 1972 JRA gunmen attacked Lod airport in Israel, killing 24 (including 16 Christian pilgrims from Puerto Rico) and injuring 78. In June 1987 a JRA operative was arrested on the New Jersey Turnpike with a car full of explosives. The group has not been active in over a decade and most of its leaders are imprisoned.

The Japanese government and people feel strongly about the abduction issue. Prime Minister Abe established his national reputation taking a strong stance against North Korea on the abduction issue. Consequently Japan has stated that it can only provide indirect support for the current agreement.

North Korea’s first priority will be to maximize any possible aid package, but how the North Koreans handle talks with Japan may indicate if they have other goals as well. Other participants in the negotiations do not share Japan’s focus on the abductions issue. South Korea, threatened not only by North Korean nukes but also by North Korean artillery that could level Seoul, seeks agreeable relations with and stability in North Korea. China, already facing a flood of North Korean refugees, would like to see the North Korean economy strengthened. The South Koreans have already expressed irritation at what they interpret as Japanese intransigence in the face of a breakthrough.

A long-term North Korean ambition is to drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea. According to former Pentagon official and long-time Korea watcher Chuck Downs, writing in the Journal of International Security Affairs, North Korea has made substantial progress in achieving this goal. While the U.S. has a unique military relationship with South Korea, Japan is the closest U.S. ally in the region. For both political and moral reasons the U.S. will not pressure Japan to make concessions on the abduction issue. Stonewalling Japan, while making conciliatory gestures to South Korea, could indicate further North Korean efforts to foster splits among the participants in the six party talks.

International attention will focus on whether North Korea complies with restrictions on its nuclear program. But the character and results of the discussions of North Korea’s sponsorship of terrorism will be a gauge of whether the North Korean regime is ready to deal or playing for time.

— Aaron Mannes, author of the TerrorBlog and Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations, researches international security issues at the University of Maryland. Opinions expressed here are his own.

In the greater DC area, many of us have been following an odd and tragic story about a Keith Washington, a PG County police officer who shot two deliverymen who came to his home to deliver furniture. One of the deliverymen has since died.

It quickly came out that this officer had been involved in numerous incidents where he acted inappropriately. Quick lesson on police reporting: when bad stuff about a cop comes out quickly - it means he was not loved on the force. One of the reasons for this unpopularity was that Washington was also the county's Deputy Homeland Security director. He had previously been a political supporter of and driver for the County Executive Jack Johnson. Officers getting cush jobs due to political connections usually are not popular on the force. (Johnson, unsurprisingly, is now claiming that he and Washington were never really close.)

It is inevitable that Homeland Security will become another avenue for typical political graft and cronyism (and Johnson has a bit of a reputation for zealously helping political allies). However, PG County is not just anywhere. It is part of the National Capital Region and has a lengthy border with DC. It is a large (population of 850,000) and diverse community and home to major government and non-government institutions (including, full disclosure, my employer the University of Maryland College Park.) This is a community that needs able leadership that can effectively collaborate with the other communities of the greater DC area.

In fairness to Washington, he had a long career in the Army and claimed to have extensive counter-terror training. Maybe so, first there are serious reasons to question the officer's judgement in general. But also, the National Capital Region consists of several counties of comparable population. Playing nice with others and good judgement in general is, in this particular environment, essential.

Much of the burden of Homeland Security will fall on state and local governments. Ensuring that these programs are not used as political goodies - particularly in sensitive areas - should become a priority.

Speaking in Bogotá a few weeks ago, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Peter Pace praised Colombia’s success at battling a drug fueled insurgency and cited it as a “good model” for Afghanistan. He wasn’t just praising his hosts; the new U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan will be the outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, William Wood. While there are many positive lessons to be learned from Colombia’s successes (and failures), U.S. anti-narcotics efforts may not be the most important factor. In particular, the United States should consider carefully before initiating aerial spraying against poppy growers in Afghanistan.

Thoughtful critics of Plan Colombia (the over $700 million annual aid program to Colombia), including The Center for International Policy’s Colombia Program (CIP), have raised some important questions about the effectiveness of the Colombia model. The New York Times editorial page wrote:

The limited gains Colombia has achieved in recent years have been offset by an overly generous amnesty program for right-wing paramilitary leaders and drug traffickers, which has seriously compromised the rule of law. And American aid has been disproportionately directed into military and police programs, leaving far too little to promote alternative livelihoods for Colombia’s farmers. Despite all the money spent, the amount of land planted with coca crops has risen and the net harvest has been reduced only slightly. Afghanistan’s problems will not be solved by copying these mistakes.

Some of this critique may not be completely fair. Counter-insurgency is always a long and ugly process. The military component was the first essential step, because the security situation was a disaster. Amnesty programs are always contentious and will certainly be so if the FARC ever disarms as well. Investigations have shown that corruption is spread throughout Colombia’s political class – again, considering the amount of drug money present in the country this is hardly a surprise. Nonetheless, the public safety situation in Colombia has, according to most accounts, improved dramatically and the overwhelming re-election of President Uribe is a strong that the Colombian people feel that they are headed in the right direction. (None of this is to say the situation in Colombia is perfect. The government still has a great distance to travel in re-establishing basic services. The FARC remains a formidable, well-funded organization, some paramilitaries remain intact, and of course corruption is rampant.)

The question is, what role has U.S. aid under the auspices of Plan Colombia played in this success? Here the record is mixed. The U.S. focus has been counter-narcotics, including a heavy dose of aerial spraying. But according to both the CIP and a leading expert on counter-insurgency, NDU Professor Thomas Marks, the improvement in Colombia’s security situation was brought about by a change of strategy by the Colombian military that dove-tailed with Uribe’s election. In his monograph Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for “Democratic Security” Marks argues that Colombia’s military had an internal revolution in military affairs and switched from counter-narcotics to counter-insurgency. Formal challenges to the state’s authority – particularly the FARC – became the top priority. U.S. assistance continued to focus on counter-narcotics, but lots of the training and equipment was dual purpose.

What does this mean for Afghanistan? First, while, narcotics trafficking is loathsome, the history of efforts to counter it are checkered, at best. (There has been minimal reduction of supply.) At the same time, our real priority in Afghanistan is to see it established as a reasonably functional state and not become a base for international terror. While the Taliban are funded by opium – our ability to hurt their funding is limited. (Apparently, they are growing for more poppy than they need.) In short, funding is not the Taliban’s weak point and putting major efforts into attacking it may not pay off in terms of reducing their capabilities.

None of this, by the way, is to argue for the de-criminalization of drugs. In effect, it argues to re-criminalize them. The key in counter-insurgency – both in Afghanistan and Colombia – is to eliminate political threats to state sovereignty. Drug trafficking will continue, but it will be by criminals, who have financial motivations. No state can eliminate criminal activity, but a strong and unchallenged state is in a far stronger position to keep illegal activity to a minimum.

Two other factors in considering the Colombia model for Afghanistan. First, Colombia – while relatively poor – is far wealthier per capita than Afghanistan and maintained some modern and democratic institutions even during the worst of its civil war. Afghanistan is working from a much lower base. One justifiable criticism of Colombia’s war is that too little effort has gone into rebuilding government services after re-establishing state control. Considering the much lower effectiveness of Afghanistan’s institutions, it is essential that aid programs be adequately financed and integrated into the overall program.

Second is the controversial issue of aerial spraying to eliminate poppy fields. This is a problematic policy and Afghanistan’s President Karzai has resisted its implementation. First, it does not appear to be terribly effective at reducing supply. Second, it targets the population (poor farmers) whose hearts and minds need to be won. (It also targets them in a way that is particularly unpleasant. Regardless of their actual toxicity to humans – no one would relish having chemicals sprayed on them from the air.) Finally it is a PR nightmare. As unpopular as it is in Latin America – imagine what al-Jazeera will do with it!