If the counterterrorism world has an equivalent to Alan Greenspan - that is a figure who's every utterance should provoke immediate and dramatic reactions - it is French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere. In the French system, Bruguiere as an investigating magistrate, plays a unique and central role in counter-terror operations. He has become a leading international expert. In mid-2001, testifying at the trial of Ahmed Ressam he attempted to warn the United States of al-Qaeda's intention of attacking the United States. He was, of course, all too right.

More recently he warned that Britain and Asia were likely targets. Again - he was right.

Now he is warning that his own country is in danger and that he is particularly worried about bio, chem, or radiological.

This follows recent arrests in France. He must have learned something and his warning should be heeded.

When I first heard about the Bali bombing, my first thought was that this was a new. JI - which has a spotty record at bomb construction - has not previously used suicide vests. My first thought was Hezbollah - which has helped the Palestinians build suicide vests. But my friend Chris Brown reminded me that the Tamil Tigers have a lot of experience with suicide vests. The Tigers were believed to have run guns to Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. All of the groups of Southeast Asia are inter-connected. Abu Sayyaf is a splinter from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which has hosted training camps for Jemaah Islamiyah.

The improved bombmaking is a serious issue. Previously, JI's record was mixed. They attempted a series of church bombings on Christmas 2000, only 20 of the 38 planted bombs detonated. As devastating as the 2002 Bali bombing was, in fact many of the explosives in the truck bomb did not detonate and the explosion had multiple fuses to prevent it from being a dud.

These developments have been accompanied by a stepped up bombing campaign by Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and an increased Islamist insurgency in southern Thailand. Abu Sayyaf had generally involved itself in kidnapping. But in February 2004, Abu Sayyaf planted an explosive on a ferry in the Philippines killing over 100 people. Reportedly Abu Sayyaf's new leader, Khaddafy Janjalani wants to refocus his organization on establishing an Islamist state in southeast Asia and is cooperating closely with other groups, including JI.

This growing technical sophistication could mean a dramatic rise in violence throughout the region and needs to be watched closely. Unfortunately, Indonesia's counter-terror record does not inspire confidence. Australia's The Age reports that in the wake of the bombings PM John Howard "will urge Indonesia to ban the terror group Jemaah Islamiah."

In fairness, there is serious internal opposition to this ban:

Hidayat Nurwahid, chairman of Indonesia's Parliament and leader of the major Muslim political force, the Prosperous Peace and Justice Party, blamed the bombings on rivalry within the tourism industry.

He called for a halt to speculation that the bombings were the work of "a certain group from a certain religion".

"I have valid information that these acts may be related to inter-state competition in the tourism industry," he said.

Politics aside, Indonesian policework has been less than stellar.

The five men were freed after serving jail terms of up to two years for possessing several kilograms of explosives. They are associates of one of the planners of the first Bali attacks, Imam Samudra, and two also knew Rois, sentenced to death for his role in the bombing of Australia's Jakarta embassy last year.

When police went to arrest the men this week, they were missing from their homes.

Sources close to the investigation said it was unlikely that any of the five were suicide bombers, but they may have helped with the attacks.

I'd like to castigate Indonesian police for not keeping tabs on these guys, but again, in fairness - it is a mistake also made by Spanish and British police. Still, the Madrid and London bombings were wake up calls. The first Bali bombing should have been sufficient for the Indonesian government. Until they can crackdown effectively, there is little likelihood to terrorism being marginalized in Southeast Asia.

Although only one man was killed, perhaps the seminal moment of modern Islamist terrorism took place 24 years ago today when Egypt's President Anwar Sadat was murdered at a military parade in Cairo.

Both before and since there have been many much bloodier terror attacks. But few had the political repercussions of Sadat's assassination. Sadat had the potential to be the greatest and most transformative figure in Arab politics in the second half of the 20th century. Sadat had the wisdom to reach out to Israel and make peace. He led Egypt out of the Soviet bloc and in American orbit. He attempted to transform Egypt internally. He paid for his efforts with his life.

His decision to make peace earned him the title of heretic. Sheikh Rahman, the leading Islamist leader in Egypt issued a ruling that a heretical leader should be killed by the faithful. Foreshadowing many, more familiar such statements, Rahman carefully did not mention Sadat by name.

The irony is that it was Sadat who allowed the Islamist movements in Egypt to operate somewhat openly after decades of harsh repression by Nasser. (Nasser has been mythologized as the great secular Arab nationalist - but much of his conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood was strictly out of self-interest.) Sadat eased up on the Islamists, hoping they would help him balance out the Marxist groups that had flourished under Nasser. He was not the first or the last to make this mistake.

The aftermath of Sadat's assassination helped lay the foundations of many modern terrorist movements. The Egyptian Islamists connected to the assassination, besides Sheikh Rahman, included future al-Qaeda number two Ayman Zawahiri. These Islamists joined the great jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. When the jihad ended, most Islamists returned home. But the Egyptian Islamists were already suspected by the Egyptian government and could not. Instead they remained in Pakistan where they coalesced around Osama bin Laden and formed the backbone of al-Qaeda.

Sadat's assassination helped form them ideologically as well. The precedent for assassinating heretical leaders had been established by Sayd Qutb decades before. But, Abdullah Azzam, who re-invigorated the international Islamist movement in the 1970s and particularly during the Afghan jihad, opposed it. He felt that Islamists should not attack the "near enemy" (the heretical leaders of Muslim countries) but should focus on the middle enemy - where Islamic lands were being attacked by infidels - such as in Afghanistan and later Bosnia and Chechnya (and now Iraq.) Azzam was killed by a car bomb in 1989. Sheikh Rahman became al-Qaeda's spiritual leader. Because the Egyptians had failed in their efforts to overthrow the Egyptian government - despite killing its leader - they felt the need for a new jihad against the "far enemy,' the infidel nations that enabled the heretical Muslim regimes to remain in power. Sheikh Rahman lived this jihad, moving to the United States where members of his mosque carried out the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and plotted to attack landmarks throughout New York.

Closer at hand, after Sadat's assassination, Palestinian Islamists were expelled from Egypt. Many moved to Gaza where they reinforced the newly formed Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Yet this focus on Islamist terrorists belittles Sadat's efforts. The other modernizing leaders of the Arab world have come to power in smaller nations like Jordan and Oman. Sadat came to power the the most powerful Arab state. Egypt also had a cultural depth that gave it greater potential to become the engine of Arab transformation. In the first half of the 20th century Egypt was home to a prominent class of intellectuals who sought to merge their heritage with modernity. Nasser's two decades of rule devastated, but did not destroy this class. Perhaps Sadat could have reinvigorated it - but since his death Egypt has labored under the cautious, stagnant Mubarak regime.

It is impossible to say whether or not Sadat would have succeeded. But he is one of very few Arab leaders to even try. His loss was a tragedy for Egypt and the world. While only one man was killed in the terror attack 24 years ago - we are still suffering the consequences.