The Basque separatist terror group, ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty), was dealt a severe blow when its military chief Gorka Palacio Alday was reportedly captured earlier this week in southwestern France. ETA attacks have killed over 800 people since the early 1960s, when they began their rebellion against Spain. More than half of their victims were Spanish security service personnel, but they also targeted Spanish and moderate Basque politicians, and detonated car bombs in public places. Spain’s current Prime Minister, Jose Maria Aznar was the target of an ETA bombing in 1995 (he escaped unhurt.) That year ETA also attempted to assassinate Spain’s King Juan Carlos. There was a brief “peace process” (what terrorist war would be complete without one) including a ceasefire from September 16, 1998 to December 3, 1999.

Spain’s counter-terror efforts have reportedly included assassinations and alleged torture. At the same time, the Basque region has been awarded a great degree of autonomy and the majority of Spain’s 800,000 Basques do not want complete independence.

Since the end of the cease-fire the Spanish have cracked down effectively on the ETA, reducing their operations from 44 attacks with 23 killed in 2000 to 17 attacks with 3 killed in 2003. Two factors have been key to this crackdown: the heightened worldwide counter-terror measures post-9/11 and increased French cooperation. The US and the EU declared the ETA a terrorist organization, making it more difficult for the ETA to move funds and increasing inter-governmental intelligence cooperation against them. While the majority of the Basque live in northeastern Spain, a substantial community lives across the Pyrenees in southwestern France. Since the primary fight was against Spain, French counter-terror was less aggressive and the ETA used French territory as a base of operations. In the past year the French Interior Ministry has cooperated closely with Spanish authorities, leading to a series of arrests in both Spain and France and reducing the ETA’s effectiveness dramatically.

The ETA’s terror war, while rooted in a local conflict, had broader implications. ETA has been linked to terrorist groups around the world – providing and receiving training and support. ETA has been closely linked with the IRA and the PLO. These links could have been an entry to cooperation with Islamist groups (there is a report that Hamas bought some explosives from ETA). A captured al-Qaeda operative in Spain stated that there was no al-Qaeda-ETA cooperation, not on ideological grounds, but because al-Qaeda had nothing to learn from ETA. But Spain occupies a special place in the ideology of Islamists because it was part of the Muslim world until 1492 and it could become a major theater of Islamist terror operations. The Spanish government’s outspoken support for the US in Iraq may also make it a target. With a shared enemy, ETA could have become an ally to Islamist terror. That may still happen, but a broken ETA reduces that danger substantially.

Palestinian-Canadian Jamal Akkal’s confession that he was trained by Hamas to carry out attacks on Israeli targets in Canada should be a wake-up call to Canada and the whole world.

Taking the latter first – conventional wisdom was that Hamas would confine its violent activities to attacking Israel because expanding its area of operations might endanger its standing within Palestinian society where it is viewed favorably because of its social work. But making assumptions about terrorist organizations limiting their targets is a dangerous business – these are, after all, organizations that dispatch and glorify suicide bombers.

Hamas has long condemned the United States, and in January announced it would target Americans everywhere if the U.S. went to war with Iraq. Its fundraising operations and links to other terrorist groups have been global. The follow-up question is twofold:

1. What could lead Hamas to go global?
2. What resources do they have to operate internationally?

For the first question, a relevant comparison is Egypt’s al-Jihad Group, which by the late 1990s was decimated by arrests. Its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, having had little success at overthrowing the Egyptian government, decided that the real enemy was the United States. Al-Zawahiri felt, that American support kept Egypt’s government in power so thus his real fight with the U.S. Al-Zawahiri fled Egypt – into the arms of Osama bin Laden, where his terror network became a key component of al-Qaeda.

As Israeli crackdowns take a toll on Hamas’ operational capabilities Hamas will have a greater incentive to strike outside of Israel, otherwise they risk becoming irrelevant. Ultimately they may target Jewish institutions or Americans (and probably others as well).

Hamas also has formidable resources should it seek to operate globally. It already raises money from a worldwide network of supporters and because of its many attacks against Israel Hamas has a highly regarded terrorist “brand-name” to attract recruits. Hamas also has some experience operating on a global scale. In the early 1990s Abu Marzuq directed Hamas, while living in the United States – where he helped found several organizations to support Hamas including the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (closed by U.S. authorities in December 2002.)

Hamas’ network is linked to Islamist groups worldwide. Islamist charities that fund al-Qaeda also fund Hamas. Hamas cooperates closely with Palestinian Islamic Jihad and has a growing alliance with the already global Hezbollah. That these organizations, with their vast resources, may be linking up is a very serious threat.

For Canada, in particular, however, this should be a real wake-up call – and, unfortunately – it looks like the Canadian authorities hit the snooze alarm.

The Canadian government’s reaction to Israel’s announcement was to criticize Israel’s ambassador for his inappropriate comments and insist that Akkal was innocent until proven guilty. Certainly due process is important – but a central lesson of the war on terror is that speedy action can disrupt terror cells before attacks occur while hesitancy can be very costly in lives and intelligence.

Unfortunately, Canada has been tentative and cautious (perhaps the most reticent of the Anglosphere) in the war on terror. Only in late 2002 were Hamas and Hezbollah declared terrorist entities be the Canadian government. Canada has already proven to be a comfortable theater of operations for terrorists. Hamas raised hundreds of thousands of dollars annually in Canada throughout the 1990s. Hezbollah operatives purchased equipment in Canada such as night vision goggles, scuba gear, blasting caps, laser range finders, and GPS systems. Canadian Hezbollah members were also taking out life insurance policies on likely suicide bombers!

As an open society with ease of movement, relatively easy access to weapons and explosives, and plethora of soft targets – including Jewish and Israeli organizations – Canada could become a major field of operations. (Recent reports that the Canadian military is woefully underfunded and overstretched only encourage terrorism. Terrorist groups are probably not quaking with fear that Canada may come after them.)

Most ominously, Canada could become a terrorist gateway into the U.S. – in fact, this has already happened. In December 1999 Ahmed Ressam was arrested crossing the U.S. Canadian border with a trunk-load of explosives and detonators. He was planning to attack the Los Angeles International Airport as part of a wave of bombings on the eve of the millennium. Ahmed Ressam was part of a group of Algerian refugees recruited in Montreal who trained in Afghanistan.

Attacks on the U.S. with Canadian links would have a secondary target – so big and obvious that it is often overlooked. The U.S.-Canadian border, the largest and most open in the world, is a core strategic interest of both countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars of trade crossing the border annually is central to both economies. It also symbolizes the open relationship of two large free democracies comfortably at peace with each other. Terror emanating from Canada could damage this openness and, depending on the scale, in a way that is impossible to restore. It would be a terrible victory for terrorism – and a costly loss for freedom.

Border guards on both sides are highly professional, but the volume of traffic is too great to rely on this last line of defense. Jamal Akkal and Ahmed Ressam show that the threat of terrorist operations in Canada is not hypothetical; it is a clear and present danger. Canada must take an active approach to squelching it – and hope that it is not already too late.